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Abstract
Several European countries have reformed their labor market in-
stitutions. Incentive e¤ects of unemployment benets have been an
important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-
agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity.
In our model, a higher level of unemployment benets improves the
workersposition in wage bargaining, leading to stronger e¤ort incen-
tives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor
market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-o¤. We analyze
how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and
better educated workers a¤ect this trade-o¤.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of benet payments on worker productivity
and unemployment levels. We assume that relationships between rms and
wealth-constrained workers su¤er from moral hazard since e¤ort on the job is
non-contractible. Higher unemployment benets improve the workersbar-
gaining position in contract negotiations. As a result, they receive a larger
share of the surplus, which strengthens their e¤ort incentives. On the other
hand, there will be more workers leaving the labor force. The optimal level
of unemployment benets balances this trade-o¤.
In recent years, a number of countries have undergone substantial reforms
of their labor market institutions. Often, this involved reductions in the level
or duration of unemployment benets. For example, in Germany unemploy-
ment benets amounted to 67% of the last net income and were paid for up
to 32 months. Thereafter, the unemployed received an unlimited assistance
of 57% of their last net income.1 In 2005 this was substantially changed with
the so-called Hartz IV legislation. Now, unemployment benets are usually
paid for 12 months. Thereafter, the unemployed receive a xed payment
that does not depend on the previous wage and equals the payment to those
people who have never worked.2 Other countries have implemented similar
reforms that reduced unemployment benets (see Saint-Paul (2004), Nickell,
Nunziata, and Ochel (2005)).
This raises two questions, both addressed in this paper. First, which
factors determine the optimal level of unemployment benets? Second, can
changes in these factors contribute to our understanding why many countries
have recently reduced these benet payments? In our model higher unem-
ployment benets improve the workersthreat point in contract negotiations.
This may result in higher e¤ort and output (see Pitchford (1998); Demougin
and Helm (2006)). Furthermore, we will show that globalisation, which we
model as a better outside option of rms if contract negotiations with domes-
tic workers fail, has weakened this e¤ort-enhancing e¤ect of unemployment
benets.
In particular, we consider an environment with a continuum of work-
ers that di¤er in their skill level so that they are of di¤erent productivity.
Workers are wealth-constrained and their e¤ort is non-contractible, leading
to moral hazard. They are randomly matched with rms and bargain with
them about linear incentive contracts. Initially, we focus on the case of a sin-
1Without children the respective levels were 60% and 53%.
2See Jacobi and Kluve (2006) for a description and rst assessment of the Hartz legis-
lation.
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gle representative rm. However, we also consider an extension where rms
di¤er in their outside option.
A higher level of unemployment benets improves the workers threat
point and, thereby, their bargaining power. As a consequence, the workers
share of the total surplus from an employment relationship rises.3 Further-
more, the structure of the incentive contract changes. For ine¢ ciently low
e¤ort levels, as the workersbargaining power improves they are allocated a
higher share of the surplus by raising the incentive component of the wage
contract. This increases e¤ort and, thereby, overall surplus. Once e¤ort is
rst-best, further improvements in the workersbargaining power are com-
pensated by increasing the xed payment to them.
Accordingly, up to a certain level higher unemployment benets improve
the overall surplus from an employment relationship. However, there is a
trade-o¤ since higher benets reduce the number of rm/worker matches for
which the joint surplus exceeds the sum of their outside options. Hence more
workers become unemployed. The optimal level of unemployment benets
balances these two e¤ects.
We also examine how this mechanism is a¤ected by changes in the eco-
nomic environment. In particular, if workersskills improve, e.g. due to bet-
ter education, benet payments should be raised. The reason is that workers
e¤ort on the job becomes more valuable the better their skills. Globalisation
has an opposite e¤ect. As rmsprot opportunities from moving their cap-
ital abroad improve, there will be less domestic employment. Accordingly,
the e¤ort-enhancing e¤ect of unemployment benets becomes less important.
Obviously, linear incentive contracts are just one out of several instru-
ments that are used to incentivize workers. Other examples include pro-
motions, subjective performance evalutions and deferred compensation (see
Prendergast (1999)). Reecting this variety in a single analytical model is
not feasible. We have chosen to focus on linear incentive contracts because
they straightforwardly capture the main idea which drives our results: that
higher wages are often associated with higher e¤ort incentives. Furthermore,
linear incentive contracts appear as a suitable modelling device because they
are used for di¤erent segments of the labor force.
Our paper contributes to the rich literature on the incentive e¤ects of
unemployment benets (see Holmlund (1998) and Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2006) for surveys). A part of this literature also nds that there may be
3See van der Horst (2003) for empirical evidence that an increase in the replacement rate
(the proportion of in-work income that is maintained for somebody becoming unemployed)
enables workers to negotiate a higher wage rate. Similarly, there exists evidence for a
positive relationship between unemployment benets and reemployment earnings (e.g.,
Burgess and Kingston (1976)).
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a trade-o¤ between productivity and unemployment levels. However, the
mechanism by which this result occurs is a di¤erent one. While it is common
to focus on moral hazard in the search e¤ort of unemployed agents, we analyze
e¤ects of moral hazard during an employment relationship. In this respect,
the two approaches complement each other.
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) consider a
search model with risk-averse workers. Unemployment insurance encourages
workers to take the risk of applying for high wage jobs, and rms respond
by creating more capital-intensive, high productivity jobs. Thereby, output
is raised, but also the risk of becoming unemployed. Moreover, due to moral
hazard workers may respond to higher benet payments by reducing their
search e¤ort. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) as well as Diamond (1981) also
stress the role of unemployment benets as a "search subsidy" that allows
the unemployed to take the time necessary to nd a suitable job.4 Mortensen
(1977) emphasizes the entitlement e¤ect which arises since unemployed peo-
ple are often not eligible to benet payments (see also Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2001)). Therefore, high unemployment benets provide an additional
incentive to seek employment so as to become entitled to them in the case of
a future job loss.
Our paper is also related to the literature on e¢ ciency wages since both
focus on endogenous work e¤ort. In the e¢ ciency wage model, higher unem-
ployment benets reduce the costs of shirking and, therefore, e¤ort incentives
(Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). However, the opposite result arises when the
regulator can pay lower unemployment benets to agents that have been
shirking, as compared to agents that have lost their job for other reasons.
In this case, the spread between the utility from shirking and non-shirking
increases, which strengthens e¤ort incentives (Goerke (2000)).5
The remainder of the text is structured as follows. After introducing the
basic model (section 2), we analyze contract negotiations for an individual
rm/worker match (section 3). In section 4, we examine the e¤ect of unem-
ployment benets on e¤ort incentives and participation decisions. Section
5 determines the optimal level of social benets. In section 6 we analyze
the comparative statics for worker skills and rm mobility. Finally, in the
concluding section 7 we present some empirical evidence for our analytical
results and the underlying mechanism.
4Other important contributions that focus on moral hazard in search e¤ort in their
analysis of optimal employment insurance are Shavell (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997).
5Wang and Williamson (1996) also assume that the probability of remaining employed
depends on a workers e¤ort.
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2 The model
We consider an environment populated by a continuum of risk neutral rms
and risk neutral workers of equal measure. Firms are identical. Workers
di¤er in their respective skills, which are measured by the parameter  2 R+
and distributed according to the density function f().6 Workers and rms
are randomly matched in pairs. After the matching, each rm observes the
workers skill and negotiates with him an employment contract. The value
of a match with a  worker undertaking e¤ort a 2 R+ is v(a), where v(a) is
increasing concave and satises the Inada conditions. All workers have the
same e¤ort cost function c(a), which is increasing and convex with c0(0) = 0.
Labor relationships su¤er from a moral hazard problem with respect to
the workers e¤ort. However, e¤ort generates a contractible signal which the
rm can use to align incentives. As is well known from the literature, due
to the risk-neutrality we can restrict attention to a binary signal m 2 f0; 1g,
where m = 1 is the favorable signal (see Milgrom (1981)).7 We denote with
p(a) the probability of observing the favorable signal given the workers e¤ort
and assume p0(a) > 0; p00(a) < 0.8 In addition, we assume that workers are
nancially constrained requiring wage payments to be non-negative.9 Due
to the structure of the problem, contracts will be binary; the worker always
receives a xed payment F and, in addition, a bonus b when m = 1, whereby
payments must satisfy F; F + b  0.
A priori, the optimal contract negotiated by a specic rm/worker pair
will depend on the skill parameter  characterizing that particular match.
However, in order to keep notation to a minimum, we suppress this de-
pendence on  whenever possible without confusion. Consider now such a
rm/worker match: If negotiations are successful and the worker undertakes
e¤ort a, it leads to the payo¤s
U  F + bp(a)  c(a); (1)
  v(a)  F   bp(a) (2)
for the worker and the rm respectively. Alternatively, if negotiations fail,
the parties receive their respective outside opportunities; the worker becomes
6The assumption of a productivity close to zero may seem rather strong. However, it
reects the widely expressed concern that a certain percentage of the potential workforce
lacks even the most basic prerequisites for employment.
7Specically, in a risk-neutral agency problem all relevant information from a mecha-
nism design point of view can be summarized by a binary statistic (see, e.g., Kim (1997)).
8These conditions guarantee that the agents problem is well behaved. They are equiv-
alent to considering binary signals satisfying MLRC and CDFC within the class of di¤er-
entiable signals with constant support.
9Otherwise the rst-best is obtainable, as is well known from the literature.
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unemployed, obtaining benet payments s  0; while the rm invests its
capital elsewhere, receiving r  0. We refer to contracts that lead to U  s
and   r as "mutually benecial".
Altogether, the game proceeds as follows. First, the regulator chooses
unemployment benets. Second, rms and workers are randomly matched
in pairs. Third, each pair negotiates an incentive contract. If negotiations
fail, the parties receive their respective outside opportunity. Otherwise, the
worker undertakes e¤ort, the signal is realized and payments are made. In
the remaining, the game is solved by backwards induction.
3 Negotiations of incentive contracts
In this section, we consider a rm/worker match for which a mutually bene-
cial, incentive-compatible contract exists. At the last stage of the game, if
negotiations were successful, the worker faces a contract fF; bg and chooses
e¤ort to maximize his payo¤. The shape of p(a) and c(a) imply a concave
payo¤ function for the agent. Thus, e¤ort follows from the rst-order condi-
tion of (1):
bp0(a) = c0(a). (3)
In the preceding stage of the game, parties negotiate the contract. For the
moment, we abstract from the specic bargaining process, but assume that it
leads to e¢ cient outcomes subject to the incentive, wealth and participation
constraints (examples for which this is the case are the alternating o¤er game,
the egalitarian solution and the Nash bargaining solution).10 Analytically,
the set of e¢ cient outcomes, hereafter the constrained Pareto frontier (CPF),
is dened as the set of payo¤pairs (; U) that arise if we maximize the rms
payo¤, thereby varying the constraint on the workers payo¤ U :
max
a;F
v(a)  F  B(a); s.t. (I)
B(a) =
c0(a)p(a)
p0(a)
; (IC)
F  0; (FC)
F +B(a)  c(a)  U: (PC)
Here, (IC) is the incentive-compatibility constraint that follows from (3),
where B(a)  b(a)p(a). Accordingly, B(a) is the expected bonus which the
10The latter will be analyzed in more detail below.
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Figure 1: Contract Negotiations
rm has to pay in order to induce e¤ort a. We assume that B(a) is convex,
which ensures that the rst-order condition of the Langragian is su¢ cient.
Condition (FC) is the workers nancial constraint, and (PC) is the constraint
that assures participation of the worker.
Figure 1 depicts the CPF. First, consider the case U = 0: From the curva-
ture assumptions, B(a)  c(a) is positive and increasing in e¤ort. Hence, for
any strictly positive e¤ort the workers participation constraint (PC) cannot
bind, and the agent receives a strictly positive rent. Moreover, F enters neg-
atively into the rms prot function so that F = 0. Thus, the rms prots
can be written as
 = v(a)  c(a)  [B(a)  c(a)] ; (4)
where the term in square bracket is the agents rent. Writing the prot this
way emphasizes that the rm compensates the agent for his e¤ort costs and,
in addition, pays him a rent. Since the marginal rent is positive, the ensuing
e¤ort level, a, will be below the rst-best e¤ort, a, which solvesmax+U ,
yielding
v0(a)  c0(a) = 0: (5)
Second, raising the constraint on the workers payo¤, U; does not a¤ect
the outcome of the contract until U = U  B(a)   c(a). Accordingly,
the dashed segment of the curve in gure 1 does not belong to the CPF since
such payo¤ proles cannot arise from an incentive-compatible contract.
Third, when U  U, further increases in U must be compensated by
raising either b or F . Increasing b raises e¤ort. Therefore, it is initially
advantageous until e¤ort reaches the rst-best level a. This yields U 
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B(a)  c(a). At that point any further increase in U is best compensated
by lump sum transfers F so that the CPF has slope  1. We summarize
these results in the following proposition (for a formal proof see Demougin
and Helm (2006)).
Proposition 1 The constrained Pareto frontier is strictly decreasing and
concave. Specically, for low values of U , the optimal contract has F = 0,
the agent extracts rent and e¤ort is constant at the second best e¤ort level
a. For intermediate values of U , F = 0, and e¤ort is increasing in U . For
high values of U , the optimal contract implements rst-best e¤ort a and has
F = U + c(a) B(a).
In order to analyze the e¤ect of unemployment benets on the negoti-
ated contract, we have to make a concrete assumption with respect to the
bargaining process. Specically, we assume that the outcome of negotiations
follows from maximizing the Nash product for equal bargaining power,
N  (U   s) (  r) ; (6)
with respect to feasible contracts; i.e. contracts that satisfy the incentive,
nancial and participation constraint.11 Given our focus in this section on
rm/worker matches for which mutually benecial contracts exist, this yields
a solution along the CPF (see Demougin and Helm (2006)). Thus, the out-
come of negotiations solves:12
UN ;N = argmax
U;
N s.t. U; 2 CPF:
As we are in the case where mutually benecial contracts exist, the dis-
agreement point (s; r) must lie (i) either on the dashed segment of the curve
in gure 1, (ii) or on the CPF, (iii) or below the dashed segment or the CPF.
In the rst case, the bargaining outcome will be (U;) as it follows from
the restriction on incentive-compatible contracts and the above discussion.
In the second case, the parties simply implement the contract that yields the
disagreement point.
The third case, where (s; r) lies strictly below the dashed segment or
the CPF, is the most relevant. Here, the problem of maximizing the Nash
11Many of the following results are not restricted to this specic assumption about the
bargaining process. For example, the egalitarian solution would be obtained by moving
along an array that starts at (s; r) at a 45 angle to the CPF. Upon raising s, the egalitarian
solution moves to the right along the CPF, as will be shown to be the case with the Nash
bargaining solution.
12We use superscripts N to denote the Nash bargaining solution.
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product given the feasibility constraint can be represented geometrically by
the introduction of iso-Nash curves that are characterized by a constant N
in (6). In the (U;) space, holding s and r constant, it is easily veried that
the iso-Nash curves are decreasing convex with slope
d
dU

N=constant
=    r
U   s: (7)
Furthermore, the Nash product increases in the North-East direction.13
Altogether, the (constrained) Nash bargaining solution, (UN ;N); is charac-
terized by a tangency of the iso-Nash curve with the CPF.
Lemma 1 The Nash bargaining solution has the following properties:
a) If aN = a, then   r = U   s.
b) If aN < a, then U   s >   r > 0 or U   s    r = 0.
c) Moreover, v0(aN) B0(aN)  0.
The lemma has a straightforward intuition. The Nash product is max-
imized if the overall surplus is maximized and divided equally between the
parties. In gure 1, the second objective is achieved if we are on the 45 line
that starts at the partiesoutside option (r; s), i.e. at point X. The rst
objective is achieved if e¤ort is e¢ cient. Geometrically, this is the case to
the right of U along the at part of the CPF where it has slope  1.
In the solution under (a), there is no conict between the goals of max-
imizing the surplus and that of an equal division. This is the case if the
partiesoutside options are such that the 45 line intersects the CPF to the
right of U. Analytically, statement (a) then follows from (7).
However, in some cases, attaining the rst goal of maximizing the overall
surplus would require paying out a large bonus to the worker in order to
induce rst-best e¤ort. Attaining the second goal of dividing this surplus
equally between the two parties would then necessitate a negative xed pay-
ment so as to equalize the surplus between the two parties. The workers
nancial constraint, F  0; makes such a solution infeasible, thereby intro-
ducing a trade-o¤ between both goals. At the optimum the parties set F = 0
and negotiate a reduction of the bonus, trading o¤ the surplus loss against
the benets of a more equal surplus allocation. In the lemma, this is the rst
case under (b).
13See Muthoo (1999, 12) for a similar approach.
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Geometrically, such a situation is depicted in gure 1, where the optimal
solution lies in between the equal surplus allocation (point X) and the e¤ort
maximizing solution subject to participation (point Y ) so that U s >  r >
0. Analytically, this statement follows from the fact that for aN < a the
slope of the CPF is jU j < 1 and the slope of the iso-Nash curve as given
by (7). The second case under (b) arises if the disagreement point lies (i) on
the dashed segment of the curve so that the worker obtains U > s , or (ii)
on the CPF so that U   s =   r = 0.
The last claim in lemma 1 states that the value for the rm of a marginal
increase in e¤ort is (weakly) lower than the additional expected bonus which
it has to pay to the worker for raising his e¤ort. Observe that a  aN  a.
Moreover, from (4) a is implicitly dened by
v0(a) B0(a) = 0: (8)
Thus, the statement follows by concavity of (4).
Finally, we obtain the following intuitive result.
Corollary 1 More productive agents face higher powered incentives and ex-
ert higher e¤ort.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Incentive e¤ects of unemployment benets
4.1 E¤ort incentives
We now analyze the e¤ect of variations in the level of social benets on e¤ort.
As in the previous section, we focus on rm/worker matches for which a
mutually benecial, incentive-compatible contract exists. This means that
(s; r) 2 
, where 
 is the set of points on or below the curve in gure 1,
including the dashed segment. Formally, 
  fs; r  0 such that there exists
a UN ;N with UN  s and N  rg:
Consider a disagreement point as in gure 1 for which the Nash bargaining
solution leads to an ine¢ cient e¤ort level. Raising s shifts the disagreement
point to the right. Hence the tension between equal surplus distribution and
e¤ort e¢ ciency measured as the distance between points X and Y  is
reduced. The Nash bargaining solution moves along the CPF to the right.
Thus, the contracted e¤ort level increases by Proposition 1.
Intuitively, as the workers outside option s improves, his payo¤ U must
increase. As long as e¤ort is not Pareto e¢ cient, this is best achieved by
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raising the bonus. As we keep increasing s, one of two things can happen.
Either the disagreement point moves outside the set 
, at which point con-
tract negotiations would fail, or e¤ort reaches the rst-best level. In the
gure, the latter occurs if the 45 line intersects the constrained Pareto fron-
tier at U. This point is characterized by equal surplus division, e¢ cient
e¤ort and F = 0, i.e.
B(a)  c(a)  s = v(a) B(a)  r: (9)
If s is above the level at which (9) holds, the parties can select F  0 in
order to achieve U(a) s = (a) r, thereby maximizing the Nash product.
Accordingly, further increases in s are fully o¤set by a higher xed payment
F . By contrast, if s is below the level at which (9) holds, the workers nancial
constraint, F  0, makes the solution U(a)   s = (a)   r unattainable.
By lemma 1 e¤ort is then ine¢ cient. These results can be summarized as
follows.
Proposition 2 Dene s^  2B(a)   c(a)   v(a) + r. Consider (s; r) 2
int(
).
a) If s < s^, then aN < a and daN=ds > 0.
b) If s  s^, then aN = a:
In the proposition, we limit the analysis to disagreement points in the
interior of 
. In this case, raising social benets has a positive e¤ect on the
e¤ort of ine¢ cient workers. However, if a disagreement point lies exactly on
the CPF, raising s implies that mutually benecial contracts no longer exist.
4.2 Successful matches
We now extend the analysis by considering workers of di¤erent skill lev-
els . Matches with di¤erent workers generate di¤erent constrained Pareto
frontiers, hereafter CPF(). Intuitively, an increase in productivity shifts
the constrained Pareto frontier outwards. Mathematically, raising  means
that for any given U , the rm obtains a higher payo¤, since even without
adjusting the contract prots would increase due to the productivity gain.
This implies that the set of disagreement points for which mutually benecial
contracts exist, 
(), also depends on the specic worker.
Consider an arbitrary disagreement point (s; r) and dene the critical
worker c such that the boundary of 
(c) passes through that disagrement
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point.14 Accordingly, mutually benecial contracts exist only for workers
with productivity   c. In contrast, low skilled workers with  < c
become unemployed because for them no mutually benecial and incentive-
compatible contracts exist.
In order to analyze how policy variations in benet payments s a¤ect
the unemployment level, we distinguish two cases. First, suppose that the
disagreement point dening c lies to the right of U(c), i.e. on CPF(c).
From gure 1, an increase in s shifts the disagreement point to the right,
thereby raising c. This unequivocally increases the unemployment level.
However, from proposition 2 workers characterized by  > c, who exert
ine¢ cient e¤ort, are now induced to raise e¤ort. Thus, there is a trade-o¤
between the unemployment level and e¤ort e¢ ciency.
Second, suppose that the disagreement point (s; r) lies on the dashed, at
part of the boundary of 
(c), i.e. to the left of U(c). Accordingly, small
variations in s do not a¤ect c. As a result, increasing s leaves unemployment
unchanged. Nevertheless, more productive workers  > c are again induced
to raise e¤ort.
Proposition 3 Consider a disagreement point (s; r) with associated c.
a) If s < U(c), then a marginal increase in s has no e¤ect on c and
unemployment.
b) If s  U(c), then an increase in s raises c and unemployment.
Accordingly, for low levels of unemployment benets, i.e. s < U(c),
raising s improves e¤ort e¢ ciency without increasing unemployment. In
contrast, for s  U(c) there is a trade-o¤ between e¤ort e¢ ciency and
unemployment. In the following, we analyze the resulting regulators problem
of balancing this trade-o¤.
5 The optimal level of unemployment bene-
ts
We now consider the problem of a benevolent regulator who chooses the level
of unemployment benets s in order to maximize social welfare. For each
14Observe that as  converges to zero, 
() converges to the point of origin. In contrast,
as  becomes unbounded, 
() converges to the positive quadrant. Thus, by continuity
there exists a critical worker c such that the boundary of 
(c) passes through the
disagrement point.
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unemployed worker, s constitutes a cost for the state and simultaneously
a benet for that unemployed person. In the aggregate these two e¤ects
cancel out. Moreover, for parsimony we ignore the excess burdens associated
with the nancing of unemployment benets, such as distortionary costs of
taxation. As a result, the social welfare function is
W 
Z 1
c
[v(a)  c(a)]f() d +
Z c
0
rf() d; (10)
where a is the e¤ort of the worker with skill . The rst term represents
the welfare derived from domestic employment relationships, and the second
term represents the value of the rmsoutside opportunity for unsuccessful
matches.
The regulator maximizes welfare, anticipating the outcome of contract
negotiations as analyzed in the previous sections. The resulting rst-order
condition isZ 1
c
[v0(a) c0(a)]da
ds
f() d d
c
ds
[cv(ac)  c(ac)  r] f(c) = 0: (11)
The rst term reects the positive e¤ect of raising s as ine¢ cient workers
will increase their e¤ort. The square bracket in the integral is positive for
matches leading to ine¢ cient e¤ort and nil otherwise. Moreover, by propo-
sition 2 da=ds > 0 for matches with ine¢ cient e¤ort.
The second term reects the negative e¤ect of raising s as this increases
unemployment. By proposition 3, dc=ds  0. Furthermore, observe that
cv(ac)   c(ac) measures the unused potential of workers just becoming
unemployed due to the raise in s. That e¤ect is only partially o¤set by
the rmsoutside opportunity r so that the second square bracket in (11) is
also positive.15 Altogether, the optimal level of unemployment benets, s,
balances both e¤ects. In particular, it implies the following result.
Proposition 4 The optimal level of unemployment benets, s; is strictly
positive.
Proof. See appendix.
For graphical illustration, suppose that gure 1 depicts the CPF of the
critical worker c. With s = 0 the disagreement point would lie on the verti-
cal axis and, therefore, on the dashed segment of the curve, which does not
15Since the disagreement point for the critical worker lies on the boundary of 
(c), we
have cv(ac) B(ac) F  r = 0. As B(ac)+F > c(ac) by the curvature assumptions
and F  0, the second term in square brackets is clearly positive.
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belong to the CPF. From the previous results we know that a marginal in-
crease in s does not a¤ect the participation decision of worker c but increases
the e¤ort of those workers  > c that exert ine¢ cient e¤ort. Therefore, the
regulator could increase e¤ort e¢ ciency without raising unemployment.
The rst-order condition (11) also illustrates that the positive e¤ect of
unemployment benets on welfare is actually driven by the moral hazard
problem. If e¤ort were contractible or in the absence of the workers-
nancial constraints  the term da=ds would be zero so that we would get
a boundary solution with s = 0. By contrast, if benet payments had no
negative e¤ect on employment, s would be raised until all agents undertake
e¢ cient e¤ort.
The optimal level of unemployment benets, s, depends on the underly-
ing parameters of the model. In the remaining, we examine how changes in
the distribution of skill levels and in the rmsoutside options a¤ect s.
6 Comparative static analysis
6.1 Changes in workersskill levels
In this section, we discuss improvements in the distribution of skills, which
may arise from improvements in education or production technologies. In or-
der to analyse this issue, we now assume that workersskills are log-normally
distributed, i.e.
f(;; ) =
1

p
2
e 
(ln  )2
22 ; (12)
where  and  are the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of .
This distribution is often used in the empirical literature on human capital
(see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992); Heckman and Honore (1990)). We in-
terpret an improvement in the skill distribution as an increase of its mean
. Maximizing social welfare as given in (10) for this distribution yields the
rst-order condition:Z 1
c
[v0   c0]da
ds
1

e 
(ln  )2
22 d   d
c
ds
[cv   c  r] 1
c
e 
(ln c )2
22 = 0: (13)
Applying the implicit function theorem with respect to , we obtain (see
appendix)
ds
d
=
R1
c
[v0(a)  c0(a)]dads e 
(ln  )2
22
ln  ln c
2
d
 Wss > 0: (14)
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Note that each term under the integral in (14) is non-negative. Further-
more, at s the second-order condition implies Wss  d2W=ds2 < 0.
Proposition 5 Suppose that workers skills are (; )-log-normally distrib-
uted. Then the optimal level of unemployment benets increases in .
Intuitively, the result obtains because with higher skilled workers the
welfare loss associated with "ine¢ cient e¤ort" increases. Thus, the regulator
becomes more willing to raise s although it increases unemployment.
6.2 Changes in rmsoutside options
It is widely argued that in the course of globalisation rmsability to relocate
abroad has improved. In our model, we capture this by an improvement
in rms outside options. From the previous analysis, we know that this
leads, ceteris paribus, to more unemployment and a lower e¤ort level. We
now examine the regulators optimal response with respect to social benets.
Should the latter be raised to counterbalance the rmsimproved bargaining
power, or reduced to weaken incentives to move abroad?
In the above analysis, we considered a continuum of heterogenous workers
while rms were assumed identical. In order to analyze globalisation, we now
take the opposite approach. We x workersskills at a uniform level , but
assume that there exists a continuum of rms di¤ering in their outside option
r. This approach reects that some rms are less mobile than others. It also
enables us to represent better outside options as a change in the distribution
of r.
As before, workers and rms are randomly matched in pairs. Accordingly,
for each individual rm/worker match, contract negotiations are exactly as
described in section 3. However, all workers are now characterized by the
same constrained Pareto frontier and by the same set 
 of disagreements
points for which mutually benecial contracts exist. Therefore, for a given
level of social benets s there now exists a critical rm rc such that the
disagreement point (s; rc) lies on the boundary of 
. Accordingly, contract
negotiations lead to employment if and only if r  rc.
By the same arguments that prove proposition 3, it can be readily shown
that drc=ds  0, with a strict inequality whenever s  U. Intuitively, in-
creasing s implies that less rms will nd a protable domestic match. Simi-
larly, by the same arguments that prove proposition 2, we obtain daN=dr < 0
if r  r^  v(a) + c(a)  2B(a) + s and aN = a if r < r^. From the de-
nition of r^ and s^ it can be seen that e¤ort e¢ ciency depends on the relative
level of the outside options. This ratio becomes more favorable for the worker
as s increases or as r falls.
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As in the previous section, we focus on a log-normal distribution of the
random variable r with support r 2 [0;1].16 If a worker  is matched with
a rm r  rc, they will negotiate a mutually benecial contract. Otherwise,
the rm receives its outside option r, while the matched worker becomes un-
employed and receives benets s. Hence, given the extension to heterogenous
rms social welfare becomes
cW  Z rc
0
[v(ar) c(ar)] 1
r
p
2
e 
(ln r )2
22 dr+
Z 1
rc
r
1
r
p
2
e 
(ln r )2
22 dr: (15)
where  and  are now the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of
r.
We interpret an improvement in the distribution of the rms outside
option as an increase of its mean . By implicit di¤erentiation of the rst-
order condition of (15) we obtain at the optimum17
ds
d
=
R rc
0
[v0(ar)  c0(ar)]dads 1re 
(ln r )2
22
ln r ln rc
2
dr
 cWss < 0: (16)
The sign follows because ln r   ln rc < 0 for all r 2 [0; rc) so that the last
term under the integral is negative.
Proposition 6 Suppose that rmsoutside options are (; )-log-normally
distributed. Then the optimal level of unemployment benets decreases in .
Intuitively, as the rmsoutside options improve, there are less protable
rm/worker matches. Accordingly, the number of matches for which unem-
ployment benets s have a positive e¤ect on e¤ort has fallen. Hence, by
reducing s the regulator can alleviate the unemployment problem, which has
become more severe due to the rmsbetter outside options, at a lower cost
in terms of e¢ ciency losses.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have argued that non-contractible e¤ort of nancially con-
strained workers provides a rationale for unemployment benets. The ensu-
16The following results can also be obtained for many other distributions such as the
exponential.
17The calculation steps for deriving this expression are the same as in the previous
section.
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ing moral hazard problem implies that properly designed policies may im-
prove workers e¤ort e¢ ciency. In particular, unemployment benets im-
prove the bargaining position of workers, enabling them to negotiate higher
expected wages. For some matches, this raises the agreed upon bonus,
thereby strengthening the workersincentives and improving e¢ ciency. How-
ever, higher unemployment benets also reduce the number of rm/worker
matches for which mutually benecial contracts exist. The optimal benet
level balances these two e¤ects.
An overview of OECD data suggests that empirical observations are con-
sistent with this trade-o¤. For the period 1995-2004, we nd that in 81%
of the OECD countries there is a positive relation between changes in the
level of long-term unemployment and in the net replacement rate, which
measures the proportion of in-work net income that is maintained for some-
body becoming unemployed. Moreover, in 76% of the countries in which
the net replacement rate has been increased (reduced), the growth of labor
productivity has been above (below) average.18 More systematic empirical
studies have come to similar results. Specically, there is substantial evi-
dence that a rise in unemployment benets tends to increase unemployment
(e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Lalive, Ours, and Zweimüller (2006)).
Furthermore, Blanchard (2004) shows that in many European countries high
benet payments have led not only to high unemployment levels, but also to
a relatively high productivity per hours worked. Using a quantitative model
that is calibrated to capture the U.S. labor market for high school graduates,
Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) also nd a positive e¤ect of unemployment
benets on productivity.
While these ndings are consistent with the results from our model, there
is less direct evidence regarding the specic mechanism which we have dis-
cussed in this paper. Van der Horst (2003) nds that an increase in the
replacement rate allows workers to negotiate higher wages, but leads to more
unemployment. Furthermore, there is an empirical literature which veries
the link between higher boni and e¤ort (e.g. Prendergast (1999); Chiappori
and Salanié (2003)). Nevertheless, several other determinants of unemploy-
ment levels and worker productivity exist (see, e.g., OECD (2007)). The
18Data on the net replacement rate (NRR) of unmarried persons without children dur-
ing the rst year of unemployment are from OECD: Benets and Wages 2004. Data on
long-term unempoyment as percentage of total unemployment are from OECD: OECD
in Figures, 2005 and 2006-07 editions. Growth of labor productivity is measured as the
quotient of the growth of gross value added and employment in the business sector (data
extracted from OECD.stat). The sample consists of the OECD countries except Mex-
ico, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Turkey due to incomplete data (the second gure also
excludes Hungary).
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relative importance of these factors is an empirical question which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Turning to our comparative static results, we found that the optimal
level of unemployment benets increases in the average skill level of workers,
while it decreases with the rmsoutside option. The rst result appears
consistent with the observation that states with high education levels often
a¤ord relatively generous unemployment benets, as for example the Nordic
countries. Furthermore, if globalisation has improved rmsoutside options,
we nd that the second prediction is also compatible with casual observations.
Particularly, the e¤ect of globalisation is often emphasized as a reason for
reducing the "welfare state".
There are several possible extensions of the paper. For example, we have
only considered a uniform level of unemployment benets. However, for ef-
ciency reasons one would expect that benets should be higher for more
skilled workers. Intuitively, more skilled workers are less likely to become
unemployed, while an increase in their e¤ort due to an improved bargaining
power is particularly benecial. This would provide a justication for the de-
pendence of benet payments on previous earnings. Another extension would
be to explicitly introduce capital into the model and discuss the implication
of unemployment benets on investment decisions and growth.
Appendix
Proof of corollary 1
From (5) and (8), rst-best and second-best e¤ort, a and a, are increasing
in . For intermediate values of e¤ort, a < aN < a, note that F = 0 by
proposition 1. Hence the constrained Nash bargaining solution follows from
maximizing
N = [B(a)  c(a)  s] [v(a) B(a)  r] :
By implicit di¤erentiation of the corresponding rst-order condition,
daN
d
=  NaNaa > 0
since Naa < 0 from the second-order condition and Na > 0. Finally, b0(a) >
0 from (3). 
Proof of proposition 4
By contradiction, suppose that s = 0. In gure 1, the threat point (r; s = 0)
would then lie on the vertical axis. By denition of the critical worker c,
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the boundary of 
(c) passes through this threat point. Now consider a
worker c + ", where " is a small number. The threat point (r; s = 0) lies in
the interior of 
(c + "). Therefore, Nash bargaining is characterized by the
point of tangency between the CPF and the Iso-Nash curve. Moreover, if "
is su¢ ciently small the Nash bargaining solution will lie on the left, curved
part of the CPF where e¤ort is ine¢ cient and da=ds > 0 by proposition 1.
Accordingly, the rst term in (11) is strictly positive at s = 0. Furthermore,
by proposition 1, U(c) > 0 so that dc=ds = 0 by proposition 3. There-
fore, the second term in (11) is equal to zero. In conclusion, the rst-order
condition cannot be satised at s = 0.
Finally, as s is increased, most of the matches fail and the rst term in
(11) converges to 0; while the second term is strictly positive. Accordingly,
an interior solution with s > 0 exists by the intermediate value theorem. 
Calculation of equation (14)
Implicit di¤erentiation of the rst-order condition (13) yields
ds
d
=
R1
c
(v0   c0) da
ds
ln  
2
e 
(ln  )2
22 d   dc
ds
(cv   c  r) ln c 
c2
e 
(ln c )2
22
 Wss
=
R1
c
(v0   c0) da
ds
ln  
2
e 
(ln  )2
22 d   R1
c
(v0   c0) da
ds
ln c 
2
e 
(ln  )2
22 d
 Wss ;
where the second line follows by substitution from the rst-order condition
(13). Rearranging yields (14).
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